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 After gaining independence in 1991, Macedonia set off on the hard path of 
maintaining independence and territorial integrity. Fully disarmed, rife with great 
internal problems and conflicts, surrounded by hostile neighbours, Macedonia has 
been building its national security system. Due to its modest economic and 
security resources, it has relied on generous foreign aid, primarily that of the 
USA, which have considered Macedonia the pillar of its politics on the Balkans. 
Regarding its national security system build-up and the integration into the in-
ternational security organisations, Macedonia has accomplished a lot, but is still 
faced with an array of problems, caused by the internal (primarily ethnic) strifes 
and the volatility of its environment, particularly in Kosovo. In case of armed 
conflicts that might – due to any reasons – beset Macedonia, and concerning its 
economic underdevelopment and military might, there is a small chance for suc-
cessful defence in a probable simultaneous conflict with the internal para-military 
units and armies of (possibly) several neighbouring countries.  
 
 Introduction 
 The 1991 referendum on the independence and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav 
Federal Army (YFA) from its territory, marked the beginning of a new phase in the 
development of this former Yugoslav republic. Macedonia, almost completely dis-
armed, burdened with forbidding internal problems and repudiated by all its four 
neighbours (Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and SR Yugoslavia), has found itself in an ex-
tremely awkward security position. Many observers of the security processes on the 
Balkans have predicted an outbreak of hostilities in and around this state. Macedonian 
perspectives – situated on the central geopolitical axis of the Balkan peninsula and 
without genuine political allies among its neighbours – have not been optimistic at all. 
It is thought that a new Balkan war might be much more serious than the former two 
world wars and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The experience from 
the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has taught us that, once an armed 
conflict starts, it is all but impossible to put an end to it without enormous efforts by 
international community and a terrible price to pay. In case of Macedonia, international 
community and the USA as the leading world power, have come to understand that 
ethnic problems cannot be solved by arms. On the contrary, resorting to weapons in this 
case becomes a part of the problems, aggravating them. That is why the UN and the US, 
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immediately upon Macedonia’s declaration of independence, organised peacekeeping 
forces within UNPROFOR to prevent the outside aggression and the internal ethnic 
strife between Macedonians and Albanians. Identification of Macedonia as the key area 
for the Balkan security, and dispatching American soldiers to this country, has provided 
this state with peace in a precarious environment. This grace period has served for 
getting a comprehensive picture of the real sources of threats to national security, the 
identification of national interests, the definition of policies and the build-up of a 
national security system, and for joining European security integrations. In the process 
of security consolidation, Macedonia has achieved remarkable results, but is still faced 
with a plethora of problems, which are caused by the internal relations and the 
instability of the environment, particularly the situation on Kosovo. 
 
 About the State 
 Macedonia is situated on the Balkans, for centuries a cross-roads region of the 
communication line connecting three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Geographi-
cally, Macedonia is to the east of Albania, west of Bulgaria, south of SR Yugoslavia 
and north of Greece. Macedonia covers an area of 25,713 square kilometres of a mostly 
hilly and mountainous region with a broad network of rivers and lakes. Macedonia has 
several climates; in the valleys along the Vardar and the Strume rivers, the climate is 
Mediterranean; in the northern valleys and basins surrounded by high mountains the 
climate is continental or moderately continental, while in the highest regions the climate 
is alpine.  
 According to the 1994 census, Macedonia has 1,945,932 inhabitants (66.5% Mace-
donians, 22.9% Albanians, 4.0% Turks, 2.3% Romanies, 2.0% Serbs, .4% Vlachs and 
1.8% other national minorities). It is interesting that 60% of the population are con-
centrated in big cities, and 40% live in the villages. More than 25% of the population 
live in the state capital, Skopje.1 Contrary to the official data on the ethnic composition, 
the government of the neighbouring Albania thinks that the presence of Albanians was 
minimised in the census results; it claims that almost 40% of the Macedonian 
population is Albanian.2 
 Macedonia is a parliamentary democracy, and its constitutional model accepted the 
solutions of the developed Western democracies. The legislative power is concentrated 
in Sobranje (parliament) which, according to the 1991 Constitution, is “a citizens’ rep-
resentative body”. The representatives are elected in general, direct, free, and secret 
elections for a four-year mandate. Sobranje is in permanent session. The Constitution 
stipulates that the total number of representatives may range between 120 and 140 rep-
 
 1 Euroasian File, Macedonia Special Issue, Turkish International Cooperation Agency, no. 105, August 
1998, p. 1.  
 2 Zlatko Isaković, Međunarodni položaj Makedonije /International position of Macedonia/, in: Suvremeni 
procesi i odnosi na Balkanu, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu and Centar za međunarodne studije at 
the Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade, 1997, p. 380. 
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resentatives.3 The competences of Sobranje are: designing and amending the 
Constitution, passing laws, ratification of international treaties, deciding on war and 
peace, deciding on co-operation, joining and leaving alliances, or uniting with other 
states, appointment of the judges for regular courts and the Constitutional Court.4 Head 
of the government, who constitutionally holds executive power, is a prime minister. 
President of the republic appoints prime ministers, who appoint the cabinet members, 
who are confirmed by Sobranje. The government is responsible for implementing laws, 
for the national budget, proposing bills and budget, controlling the operation of the 
administrative bodies and for establishing diplomatic relations.5 The cabinet may be 
faced with a no-confidence vote by the parliament, terminating its mandate. The cabinet 
members may not be members of parliament at the same time.  
 President of the Republic is Head of State, elected via direct and secret elections for 
a five-year mandate; the same person may be elected to this function not more than 
twice. President must be at least forty years old and a Macedonian citizen who has lived 
on its territory for at least ten years out of the fifteen years preceding the elections.6 He 
or she is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appoints and withdraws 
ambassadors, performs various ceremonial duties and proposes two members of the 
Constitutional Court.7 Under certain circumstances president may have the right of a 
suspending veto over certain bills submitted to the parliament. Although, according to 
the Constitution, the Republic of Macedonia is defined as a parliamentary democracy, 
in fact it functions more like a presidential democracy due to a very prominent role of 
its president, Kiro Gligorov, in the country’s political life.  
 
 Geostrategic Security Position 
 Situated as it is in the centre of the Balkans, Macedonia is a key traffic artery in 
south-east Europe and a pivotal communication point. Due to political, economic, and 
military considerations, the geostrategic interests of the neighbouring countries have 
historically and traditionally been linked to this region, manifested in their efforts to 
seize control over this territory. On the other hand, this is the point where not only the 
interests and ambitions of the neighbouring states collide, but also those of major 
European powers. The construction of the Balkan transversal east-west, connecting 
Macedonia (via Bulgaria) with western and eastern Europe as well as with Near and 
Middle East, and (via Albania) with the Adriatic and south-east Europe, has given this 
region a great strategic and economic prominence. Macedonia is extremely important 
 
 3 Article 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, according to: Novi ustavi na tlu bivše 
Jugoslavije /The new constitutions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia/, Međunarodna politika, Faculty 
of Law, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade, 1995, p. 139. 
 4 Article 68 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, ibid., pp. 141-2. 
 5 Article 91 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, ibid. p.148.  
 6 Article 80 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, ibid. pp.144-5. 
 7 Article 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, ibid. p.146. 
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for the security of the whole Balkan region, the reason why great European and world 
powers, particularly the US, have taken great pains not to allow the flare-up of another 
conflict on the Balkans. US policy embraced Macedonia from the moment it was cre-
ated as a state. Thanks to such American support and help, Macedonia has managed to 
fend off all the problems in its relations with its neighbours.8 
 The geographic factor, due to its topography, communication lines and other natural 
characteristics, offers very favourable conditions for the defence of Macedonia’s 
territory. However, its relatively small and closed territory, without indirect (rivers) or 
direct access to the sea, is an obstacle to organising eventual defence and receiving 
economic and military aid in case of war.9  
 
 Sources of Threats to National Security 
 Macedonia is faced with all those sources of national security risks which are typical 
for other transitional states. Official Macedonian concerns most often cite, as the 
sources of dangers to national security, the escalation of the conflict on Kosovo, and the 
expansionist aspirations of some neighbouring countries to create greater nation-states 
by seizing pieces of Macedonian territory. Internal threats to national security that are 
paid most attention to are terrorism, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts.10 This 
might be surmised from the answer to one of the questions asked in a poll conducted 
from March to May of 1996 on the random sample of 2,800 respondents by the Agency 
for public polling NIP Nova Makedonija – DATA PRESS of Skopje on the subject 
“Peace in Macedonia”. The question was: “What represents the biggest threat to peace 
in Macedonia?”; the respondents answered in the following manner (in the descending 
order): social injustice (riots) 39.86%, the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians 
39.9%, unanswered 12.56%, the outbreak of a war on Kosovo 12.43% and the 
neighbouring countries 5.86%.11 On the whole, among the sources of possible threats to 
the national security of Macedonia, the most prominent are the existing and potential 





 8 On American policy towards Macedonia, see: Radovan Vukadinović, Američka politika na jugoistoku 
Europe /American policy in south-east Europe/, Politička misao, vo. 35, no. 4, 1998, p. 16.  
 9 Slobodan Dimiškovski, Osnovi na nacionalnata odbrana na Republika Makedonija: vojno-politički 
spekti, NIP Globus, Skopje, 1996, pp. 153-64. 
 10 Bela knjiga za obranata na Republika Makedonija, Ministry of defence, Skopje, 1998, pp. 23-4. 
 11 See: Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia, paper 
presented at the XVI Conference IPRA Creating Nonviolent Futures, Australia, 8-12 June 1996, p. 25. 
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 Ethnic and Religious Conflicts 
 For Macedonia, the biggest ethnic and religious problem is the position of the Al-
banian minority that makes up 22.9% of the total population (according to some esti-
mates even 40%). Although this national minority, due to the help of international 
community, is largely integrated in the Macedonian society, enjoying a high degree of 
political, territorial, and cultural autonomy, in the long run it can represent a huge se-
curity problem for Macedonia. Due to their demographic growth, the Albanians are 
going to become a majority nation in Macedonia in a few decades, a development that 
Macedonians have not been looking forward to. If it occurs, there would be another Al-
banian state in this region that would probably strive for the unification with the ex-
isting Albania, an enormous security risk. This – but not only this – makes the Mace-
donian security issue most complex and dangerous.12  
 The fast-growing Albanian population, mostly concentrated on the part of the ter-
ritory near the border with Albania, first expressed their demand for being recognised 
as one of the two constitutive peoples and then, perhaps not so explicitly, the demand 
for a territorial-political autonomy within Macedonia. Since the Albanians did not take 
part in the 1991 referendum for the independence of Macedonia, and the government in 
Skopje refused their demand for autonomy, the Albanians began clamouring for in-
dependence. So, on 10 and 11 January 1992, they organised their own referendum, on 
which as many as 90% of the Albanians voted for independence. Skirmishes with Ma-
cedonians ensued,13 which provoked the international community to get involved. In the 
early stages of the functioning of the Macedonian state, its emerging army was not able 
to protect its borders; its borders were protected by the understaffed and undermanned 
police forces, the reason that a large numbers of Albanians from Kosovo and Albania 
illegally entered Macedonia. Basically, the conflict between the Macedonians and the 
Albanians is similar to the conflict on Kosovo.14 The existing political, economic, and 
security situation increases frustrations on both sides: one party claims that this presents 
a danger for the integrity of the Macedonian state, and the other is frustrated by the 
inability to unite with the neighbouring Albania.  
 Some majority nations, like Macedonian today, may in the coming decades become 
minorities. Thus it might happen that Macedonians, as well as some other peoples on 
the Balkans, by securing human and ethnic rights for the existing minorities, are 
securing their own future survival. On the other hand, minority ethnic groups will not 
be able to secure the conditions for their survival unless they develop effective 
 
 12 Siniša Tatalović, Etnički aspekti sigurnosti Jugoistoka Europe /Ethnic aspects of the security of south-
east Europe/, Politička misao, vol. 35, no. 2, 1998, p. 74. 
 13 In early November of 1993, Macedonian police arrested a group of Albanians and charged them with 
attempting to establish an illegal “autonomous province of ‘Ilirida’” in the west of Macedonia and later to 
secede and unite with Albania and, eventually, with an independent Kosovo. Dušan Janjić, “National 
Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians”, Balkan Forum, Vol. 3, no. 1, March 1995, 
pp. 21, 64. 
 14 For more details on this conflict, see Zlatko Isaković, “Macedonia and the Security in the Balkans”, 
CSS Survey, no. 5-6, May-June 1996, pp. 1-3. 
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communication and other kinds of relations with the majority nation. In the 
circumstances in which one loyal minority may expect that today’s majority is to 
become a loyal minority in the future, it must be able to envision the circumstances in 
which it will eventually turn into a majority population. This means that security is 
reciprocal, both today and in the future, since roles may reverse, so it is either security 
for all or for nobody.15 This means that both sides have to be able to look upon their 
security as a function of the other side’s security.  
 
 Disputes with the Neighbouring States 
 Macedonia’s independence triggered off an immediate Greek protest, since in Ma-
cedonia it is thought that a large portion of the Macedonian people live in Aegean Ma-
cedonia in Greece, and because Greece does not recognise the Macedonian nation, let 
alone that a section of it lives in Greece.16 The Greco-Macedonian dispute revolves 
around three issues: the name of Macedonia, the national flag, and some sections of the 
Macedonian constitution which, according to Greece, may imply its territorial preten-
sions towards Greece.17 Macedonia incorporated into its flag Alexander the Great’s star, 
which originated in Greece. Certain Macedonian parties and politicians claim that 
Greece “has no legitimate rights to the Aegean Macedonia”,18 and display maps on 
which 38% of the territory of the “Greater Macedonia” is within Macedonia’s borders, 
51% in northern Greece, and 11% in western Bulgaria.19 Only thanks to the US me-
diation, and the fact that the USA and its allies sent to Macedonia 796 soldiers20 as part 
of a special peacekeeping operation UNPREDEP, the conflict did not escalate. Even 
more, in bilateral talks, certain contentious issues (e. g. the flag and constitutional 
wording) have more or less been resolved. An important step in finding permanent 
solution was the recognition of Macedonia by the European Union on 6 October 1995; 
Greece also gave its blessing and lifted its economic blockade of Macedonia. For the 
 
 15 Zlatko Isaković, Međunarodni položaj Makedonije, op. cit. p. 390. 
 16 Despite Badinter’s arbitrary commission’s opinion, Macedonia was recognised only at the end of July 
of 1992, due to the Greek opposition. Greece accepted the existence of an independent state of Macedonia 
instead of “the former Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, but not under a name that would include 
the word “Macedonia”. Macedonia nevertheless became a UN member under a temporary “technical” name of 
the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” – FYROM. 
 17 Ranko Petković, Međunarodni položaj i spoljna politika balkanskih zemalja /International position and 
foreign-policy of Balkan countries/, in: Balkan ‘97, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Belgrade, 1997, p. 10. 
 18 According to Eric Herring, “International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe”, in 
Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Stanford (eds.), Building Democracy? The International 
Dimensions of Democratization in Eastern Europe, Leicester University Press, London, 1994, p. 99.  
 19 See: Hakan Wiberg: “Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia”, in Ole Weaver, Bary Buzan, 
Marten Kelstup, and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), Identity, Migrations and New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter 
Publishers Ltd, London, 1993, p. 105. 
 20 The Military Balance 1998/99, Macedonia, p. 89. 
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time being, a new name for Macedonia has not been found, primarily due to internal 
political reasons on both sides.21  
 Although Bulgaria was among the first states to recognise Macedonia, it does not 
recognise the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian language, a possible source of 
conflict between these two countries.22 The unwillingness of Bulgaria to recognise Ma-
cedonia is twofold: it wants to prove that in Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) there are no 
Macedonians, but also to express its territorial pretensions regarding Macedonia in 
which, it claims, there are no Macedonians but only Bulgarians. Bulgaria has recog-
nised the Macedonian state, but not the existence of the separate Macedonian nation i. 
e. for Bulgaria, Macedonia is just another Bulgarian state. This represents a risk not 
only for the relations between these two countries but for the security of the whole 
southeastern Europe. 
 In the relations between Macedonia and Albania, the bone of contention is the po-
sition of a large number of Albanians who live in the western and north-western part of 
Macedonia. This issue has been radicalised by some Albanian parties in Macedonia, 
whose activities have been co-ordinated with their counterparts in Kosovo and Albania. 
These internal ethnic strifes greatly affect Macedonian relations with Albania, who has 
recognised Macedonia, but considers it a state that does not belong exclusively to the 
Macedonian people. Albania is for a diplomatic solution to the problem of the Mace-
donian Albanians, but also lets it be known that in case of a war in Macedonia, it will 
not stand by idly, but plans to come to the Albanian minority’s help. 
 Although Macedonia cultivates good relations with SR Yugoslavia23, particularly in 
the economic sphere, this country presents the biggest security threat for Macedonia. 
The Macedonian public is wary about the possibility that the ethnic violence between 
Serbs and Albanians, and especially the renewed hostilities on Kosovo, might relatively 
fast spread into Macedonia. That is why the least predictable threats to the national se-
curity of Macedonia are those linked with the developments in the neighbouring 
Kosovo, or Serbia and SR Yugoslavia. The relations between Macedonia and SR 
Yugoslavia might worsen because SR Yugoslavia, due to its geopolitical and military-
strategic concerns, cannot be indifferent whether Macedonia is an independent state and 
a good neighbour or harbours on its territory military bases of great powers which 
 
 21 See: Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Security Threat to 
Greece?”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 5, no. 1, winter 1994, pp. 100-1.  
 22 After World War II, Bulgaria recognised the existence of a Macedonian minority on its territory (in 
1956, more than 63% of the population of the Pirin Macedonia declared themselves Macedonians), but this 
was soon disclaimed as was – later – the existence of the Turkish minority in that country. Stanko Todorov, a 
member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party declared in 1985 that Bulgaria is a mononational 
state. See: Vojislav Stanovčić, History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts, in: Denisov Rusinow (ed.) Yugoslavia – 
A Fractured Federalism, The Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC, 1988, p. 24.  
 23 Macedonia exports into SR Yugoslavia goods in the amount of $50,387,000, or 17.3% of total exports, 
and imports from SR Yugoslavia goods in the amount of $51,387,000, or 13% of the total imports. According 
to these indicators, SR Yugoslavia is Macedonia’s main trading partner. Eurasian File, Macedonia Special 
Issue, Turkish International Cooperation Agency, no. 105, August 1998, p. 5.  
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might pose a threat to the Yugoslav security.24 Some authors think that in case of a 
conflict between Macedonians and the Macedonian Albanians, Serbs would become 
Macedonian allies and not a threat to its security.25 
 
 National Interests 
 The goal of the Macedonian national security policy and the system of national se-
curity is to realise fundamental national interests. In defining its national interests, 
Macedonia started from very high democratic standards which should enable it a rapid 
integration into the European political, economic and security organisations. The na-
tional interests are as follows: 
• protection of life and security of the citizens; 
• protection of independence and territorial integrity of the state, securing political 
freedoms, civil and human rights, including the rights of religious, ethnic, and other 
minorities; 
• providing material well-being and prosperity of the citizens.26 
 Besides these general national interests concrete, specific interests have been de-
fined as follows: 
• economic and political integration into the European Union; 
• political or military integration into the collective systems of security (OUN, OSCE, 
NATO and WEU); 
• developing and protecting democratic institutions in the political system; 
• developing an economic system based on the market economy principles; 
• willingness for co-operation with all neighbours; 
• organisation of a defence system.27 
 
 National Security Policy 
 Starting from the stated national interests, the national security policy of Macedonia 
is a part of the global politics of the Republic of Macedonia and includes the protection 
of life and personal security of its citizens, independence and territorial integrity of the 
state, political freedoms, civil and human rights, material well-being and prosperity of 
its citizens. In order to accomplish these goals, national security policy is based on the 
following principles:  
 
 24 Slavoljub Šušić, Balkanski geopolitički košmar, NIU “Vojska”, Belgrade, 1995, p. 287. 
 25 Zlatko Isaković, Međunarodni položaj … op. cit., p. 382. 
 26 Bela knjiga za obranata … op. cit., p. 25. 
 27 Strategy of the Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, President of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 
1998, p. 11.  
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• organisation of defence as a system that enables the realisation of the right and the 
duty of each citizen to protect and defend the country, as guaranteed by the Consti-
tution; 
• organisation of defence so that it enables the individual and the collective armed 
self-defence in case of a military aggression, as guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter; 
• developing the defensive character of the defence system; 
• organisation of the military forces as deterrence in case of an aggression and other 
forms of external threats to the security of the country; the forces should be organ-
ised in such a way as to be able to offer armed resistance in case of an aggression; 
• organisation of defence with the purpose of securing a comprehensive protection of 
the inviolability of the airspace and preventing its eventual violation for carrying out 
an aggression on the third countries; 
• securing the continuity of the economic and the political system under all circum-
stances.28 
 In line with this, the political dimension of the defence strategy of Macedonia is 
based on the following: 
• deterrence from aggression; 
• defence of the country in case of an aggression; and 
• co-ordination of the defensive efforts and activities with other countries’, using 
regular venues of international co-operation.  
 In line with the Constitution of the republic of Macedonia, nobody has the right to 
recognise the occupation of the state or of any of its parts.29 This means that the defence 
system of Macedonia stems from the policy of armed resistance to any attempt of 
aggression and leading a defensive war on the entire territory. The defence system has 
the task to provide the conditions for the functioning of all government bodies and in-
stitutions and their integration into the systems of collective security. Macedonia has 
been trying to secure guarantees for its national security from the international security 
organisations; that is why it has given its support to them and opted for active partici-
pation in them. It is particularly interested in the co-operation in the creation of the new 
European security architecture based on NATO, OSCE and WEU. 
 The defence system of Macedonia has defined its peacetime and wartime structure, 
the goals of development, preparation and deployment of its armed forces in all condi-
tions, as well as their comprehensive civilian control and administration. That is why 
the defence system involves the entire defence potential of the country: the citizens, the 
government, the armed forces, the civil defence, the local self-rule bodies, the public 




 28 Bela knjiga za obranata … op. cit. p. 25 
 29 Article 123 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia … op. cit., p. 155. 
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 Defence Doctrine 
 In designing and evolving the defence doctrine, Macedonia starts from the following 
general principles: 
• constitutional and legal provisions and the adopted policies; 
• historical experiences, particularly those from the Second World War (war of lib-
eration) in Macedonia and those from the wars waged after it (particularly those led 
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia); 
• analyses of the evolution and the features of military-political doctrines in the reali-
sation of political goals; 
• analyses of today’s technology for waging wars and the character of combat systems 
and equipment; 
• estimates that, judging by the strategic situation in Europe, both now and in the near 
future, an armed conflict (a regional or continental war) on a broad scale is not 
expected; 
• the exceptionally well-developed relations of Macedonia with the European and 
world powers; 
• the fact that in its vicinity there are still certain forces that harbour expansionist as-
pirations regarding the Macedonian territory.30  
 Using its national interests and the needs of the Macedonian people and other na-
tionalities, Macedonia has made some energetic efforts to direct its activities towards 
the preservation of peace and security in the country and the Balkans. It advocates 
peaceful solutions to all contentious issues among states and peoples, co-operation and 
friendly relationships with all states, particularly with the neighbouring ones, based on 
the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and other 
countries’ interests. Nevertheless, preoccupied with its internal problems and the hostile 
neighbours, it is in no hurry to enter into security arrangements that might bring it more 
harm than benefit.31  
 Starting from these principles in its foreign policy orientation, Macedonia does not 
recognise or accept war and other forms of violence as a political means in settling dis-
putes among states but does recognise the right of every state to self-defence in accor-
dance with the UN Charter. This means that Macedonia may find itself embroiled in a 
war only if it were imposed on it by an armed attack on its independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity. 
 If that were the case, Macedonia will offer resistance to any aggressor by an all-out 
defensive war, engaging all possible human, material, technical, and spiritual resources 
at the state’s disposal on its territory; the resistance will cease only when the aggressor 
retreats from the country. In defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
Macedonia would rely primarily on its own assets and capacities, as well as on the 
support of international security organisations. All its citizens would take part in the 
 
 30 Slobodan Dimiškovski, Osnovi na nacionalnata … op. cit., pp. 239-41. 
 31 Radovan Vukadinović, Postkomunistički izazovi europskoj sigurnosti /Post-communist challenges to 
European security/, Grafotisak, Grude, 1997, p. 54.  
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defence. The basic form of resistance would be armed struggle, led by the armed forces, 
plus the utilisation of all other possible forms of combat, resistance, and unarmed un-
derground activities.  
 
 System of National Security 
 Managing national security  
 Managing national security in peace and war is done by means of constitutional and 
legitimate functions of the legislative and executive power. Sobranje of the Republic of 
Macedonia, as a representative body of the citizens and the carrier of the legislative 
power, controls how the government’s authorities are enforced in the realm of national 
security and defence, monitors the combat readiness of the state for defence, declares 
the presence of an immediate war threat, declares the state of war and the end of the 
state of war, and introduces the wartime budget. The parliamentary committee for 
interior affairs and defence participates in the preparation of all bills from the domain of 
national security and defence and controls the realisation of the legal and the con-
stitutional provisions on defence, particularly those from the Law on defence.  
 The military command is based on the principles of the integrated command in the 
use of the forces, the means and the enforcement of the obligations concerning the exe-
cution of the decisions and orders of the superior officers. President of the Republic is 
Commander-in-Chief. Within their constitutional function of Commanders-in-Chief, 
presidents define strategy and plan of the defence of the Republic, decide on the intro-
duction of security measures, regulate the organisation and the formation of the armed 
forces, their development, the deployment of the army; they also order the mobilisation 
of the armed forces and the enforcement of the security measures, and perform other 
tasks in accordance to the Law on Defence.32 Presidents chair the Security Council of 
the republic, which also includes Sobranje’s Speaker, Prime Minister and the ministers 
of security, defence and foreign affairs, and three members appointed by the president. 
The Council discusses security and defence matters and sends proposals to Sobranje 
and the government.33  
 The government of the Republic of Macedonia, as the carrier of executive power, 
has the following defence-related tasks: proposes the funds necessary for defence, 
draws up the budget for the state of war, outlines the plan for the state’s defence, dis-
cusses the issues regarding the security and the defence of the Republic and submits 
motions to Sobranje. The government decides on the regulations, decisions and other 
acts concerning national security and defence.  
 Ministry of Defence designs the defence strategy, gives estimates of the possible 
military and other threats, monitors the organisation and preparation of the defence 
system and proposes measures for its development and improvement, works out the 
 
 32 Biljana Vankovska and Ivan Cvetkovski, Pravo i odbranata, ROBZ, Skopje, 1996, pp. 308-9. 
 33 Article 86 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, p. 146.  
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defence plan, organises the transfer of security measures and monitors their imple-
mentation, identifies the developmental needs and procures the resources allocated to 
defence, plans and outlines the structure and the documents for the development of the 
armed forces, secures the command of the army, replenishes the armed forces and ar-
ranges the conscription, controls and evaluates the combat readiness of the armed forces 
and performs other tasks in line with the Law on defence. 
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 According to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, there are no restric-
tions in the co-operation with international military-political organisations, unless the 
co-operation runs counter to the Constitution and the national interests of the state. The 
Constitution stipulates that the decision to join or leave an international organisation 
can be brought by Sobranje, with the majority vote of the total number of MPs, upon 
the proposal by President of the Republic, the government or at least forty MPs.34 Based 
on this Article, Sobranje on 23 November 1993 passed the Decision on the full 
membership in the NATO. The Decision represented the basis for Macedonia’s accep-
tance in the Partnership for Peace. 
 
 Military defence 
 In order to organise military defence, Macedonia established its own armed forces 
following its independence. In case of war, the army of the Republic of Macedonia will 
carry out armed struggle. The law defines the army as an armed force of all the citizens 
of the Republic, which is in line with the civil definition of the political system of a 
state. Its fundamental constitutional task consists in diverting all potential external 
threats, as well as conducting armed struggle for the protection of territorial integrity 
and independence in case of an aggression. Exceptionally, and only by a presidential 
decree, the army of the Republic of Macedonia can take part in certain actions aimed at 
eliminating the consequences of a state of emergency. This does not change the basic 
orientation of military defence because, according to the Constitution, “a state of emer-
gency can be introduced in case of natural disasters or epidemics”. 
 The peacetime composition of armed forces is designed so that it encompasses about 
1% of the total population or about 20,000 soldiers and officers (9,000 are recruits 
doing military service).35 In accordance with their needs, and having in mind the 
existing standards in the developed democratic countries, the armed forces of the Re-
public of Macedonia are made up of two parts: the operational units and the reserves. 
The operational units are prepared in peacetime conditions for a successful execution of 
their constitutional role, if a need arises. The reserve corps of the armed forces is made 
up of the citizens who have served in the army, after which they are deployed in the 
reserve military units. The armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia consist of 
ground troops, air forces, anti-aircraft units and lake troops.  
 The ranks of the Macedonian armed forces are filled by soldiers who serve military 
service lasting nine months and professional soldiers.36 Macedonians make a majority 
of the recruits; the percentage of the Albanians increased from 7.5% in 1992 to 26.5% 
at the end of 1993. Some authors think this increase means that the Albanians have 
either decided to accept the Macedonian state as their own or want to use the army for 
 
 34 Article 121 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, p. 155. 
 35 The Military Balance 1998/99, Macedonia, p. 89. 
 36 At the end of 1996, professional soldiers and officers made up 35% of the total number of Macedonia’s 
armed forces. 
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strengthening their position in a possible conflict.37 In comparison with the neigh-
bouring countries, Macedonia has the fewest peacetime and reserve soldiers per 1,000 
inhabitants (if we exclude the members of the Albanian paramilitary troops); the num-
ber of peacetime soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants is smaller only in Bulgaria. 
 The central place in the Macedonian armed forces belongs to the training of its 
troops. Joining the Partnership for Peace meant more radical changes, primarily estab-
lishing schools for the existing sectors and agencies. There are constant changes and 
modifications in military training in order to conform to the western standards, without 
overstraining Macedonia’s financial capacities. The army has adopted a combined 
training system which includes a contractual training of soldiers, training of recruited 
soldiers and units, training of the reserves, and the regular in-service education of offi-
cers. The contractual training is modelled on the western systems. It focuses on testing 
mental and physical stamina, shooting drills in all conditions, and doing task-oriented 
drills. Training recruits and regular military service units is divided into two periods. 
The period of basic training lasts five months and the period of additional training lasts 
four months and focuses on tactical drills with ammunition. The reserves train in 
individual and group drills and exercises. Officers are educated at the Military Acad-
emy in Skopje.  
 The armed forces are not equipped with the sophisticated firepower technology, 
communication technology, state-of-the-art reconnaissance equipment, logistics, and 
other equipment necessary to a modern army. At present, their army has at its disposal 
the equipment and the weapons that used to belong to the former territorial defence of 
Macedonia. Although this is obsolete technology, it is thought that it is of utmost im-
portance for it to be handled and operated expertly and efficiently so that it can be opti-
mally used in a war. The army has gradually stocked itself: four Zlin 242 aeroplanes 
have been purchased, ten UTVA-75 aircrafts for school flights, and four Mi-17 heli-
copters38, plus a considerable quantity of ammunition for ground troops, mortars and 
rocket launchers, radio equipment and other technology, which increased the mobility 
of a part of the peacetime units, the firepower and information-dissemination power. In 
1998 200 vehicles for miscellaneous purposes were purchased, together with twelve 
armoured vehicles (BTR-80) and eighteen 105mm American howitzers, a big step in 





 37 See: Stefan Troebst, “Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused”, RFE/RL Research Report. No. 47, January 
28, 1994, p. 20. On the importance of ethnicity for the Macedonian army, see: Biljana Vankovska-
Cvetkovska, “The Trial of Democracy in: ‘Macedonia: The Ethnic Problems and the Military’, paper 
presented at the International Conference IPSA, Research Committee “Armed Forces and Society”, National 
Security and Globalisation; Seoul, South Korea, 23-26 July 1996, pp. 10-5. 
 38 The Military Balance 1998/99, Macedonia, p. 89.  
 39 Bela knjiga za obranata …, p. 78. 
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 Civil defence 
 Doctrinarily and theoretically, civil defence in the Republic of Macedonia is treated 
as a sub-system within the integral defence system; it has an appropriate place, role, 
organisation and tasks. It is an “element of the defence system of the state, organised 
and prepared to secure by non-military and non-violent means, the defence and the 
protection of the population and the material resources in peace, states of emergency, 
and war; to secure the functioning of the government, production, and social services; 
and to create the conditions for non-armed forms of aggression-resistance in case of 
need.”40 However, in practice civil defence has not been constituted yet, not even nor-
matively or legally. At present, in Macedonia there are only some elements of civil de-
fence and that in a very narrow sense. In this sector, whose tasks are protection and 
safety, there are 180 specialised manoeuvre units (manned by 14,000 reserves). Also, 
1,400 shelters, with the capacity of 130,000, have been built. As of lately, a need has 
been felt for redefining the place, role, and significance of civil defence, from the 
standpoint of its link with the military defence (armed forces), in order to increase their 
mutual efficacy and co-ordination. 
 
 Finances 
 Defence as an activity of special state interest is financed from the national budget. 
The allocation for defence budget is done for each fiscal year in accordance with the 
stipulated legal procedure. Passing the budget goes through several phases, with the 
participation of Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, the government, the Com-
mittee for Interior Affairs and Defence, and Sobranje. In the budget procedure, the right 
to give initiatives, outline drafts and proposals belongs to the executive authorities, 
while Sobranje as a legislative body votes for the budget in December of the current 
year for the next year. After the budget has been passed, the president of the Republic 
signs the declaration of the budget proposal, after which it is treated as a public 
document and published in “Službeni vesnik Republike Makedonije”. Apart from ful-
filling its legal obligations in all the phases of the budget procedure, the Ministry of 
Defence performs other continual tasks: sees that the forces are utilised optimally, that 
the financial resources are appropriately projected, planned, and allocated into various 
funds, and takes care that the defence capacities are maximised within the framework of 
the resources allocated by the state. 
 Macedonian army may be considered the weakest on the Balkans, but its defence 
budget takes up the smallest percentage of GNP. The defence budget for 1998 was 
3,900,158,000 denars (1 dollar is 56.2 denars), which represented 2.27% of GNP or 
8.56% of the state budget.41 The structure of defence costs was as follows: 
 
 
 40 Stojan Kuzev, Civilna obranam NIP Đurđa, Skopje, 1996, p. 203. 
 41 Bela knjiga za obranata…, op. cit. p. 66. 
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No. Type of expense Amount (in denars) % 
1. Salaries 1,764,905,000 45.25 
2. Maintenance 1,686,969,673 43.25 
3. Equipment 420,147,327 10.77 
4. Research and development 8,036,000 .21 
5. Other expenses 20,100,000 .52 
 Total Expenses 3,900,158,000 100.00 
Source:  Bela knjiga za obranata na Republika Makedonija, Ministra of Defence, Skopje, 1998, 
p. 66. 
 
 In the projection of Macedonia’s economic development until 2002, an increase of 
the state budget is envisioned, based on the average annual growth of GNP of 4.3%. 
This means that the Macedonian defence budget for 2002, despite a decrease in defence 
spending to 2.1% of GNP will amount to 5,445,000,000 denars.42  
 
 The Relation Macedonia – International Community 
 The survival of independent Macedonia has to a large extent depended on the sup-
port of the international community and the deployment of the peacekeeping forces. 
The leadership has enjoyed remarkable popular support. According to the results of a 
poll in Macedonia, conducted in December of 1992, to the question “Do you approve of 
the presence of the UN peacekeeping forces in Macedonia”, 48.6% of the respondents 
answered affirmatively, 41.2% were against, while 9.59 did not answer. To the question 
“Does UNPROFOR’s presence alleviate the risk of a war in Macedonia”, 50.74% of the 
respondents answered negatively, 38.2% answered positively, while 11.4% did not 
answer. And finally, to the question “Who should have decided on the arrival of 
UNPROFOR troops to Macedonia?”, the respondents answered in the following way: 
the citizens in a referendum (43.7%), President Kiro Gligorov (21.49%), Sobranje 
(18.18%), the government (7.93%), unanswered (4.46%), minister of defence (3.14%), 
minister of the exterior (1.32%).43  
 The original UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission was later replaced by the UN-
PREDEP mission, whose mandate is based on the concept of pre-emptive diplomacy 
which has taken the following forms: (1) patrolling Macedonia’s borders with Albania 
and SR Yugoslavia, monitoring and reporting on the events that might undermine the 
trust and the stability of the host country and pose a threat to its territory; (2) strength-
ening mutual respect and promoting the dialogue among political, social and ethnic 
forces and groups in Macedonia; (3) aiding social development and progress; and (4) 
promoting multicultural and multiethnic co-operation. According to the results of the 
already mentioned 1992 poll, the answers to the question “What does UNPREDEP rep-
 
 42 Ibid,. p. 70. 
 43 Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, op. cit. p. 25. 
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resent in Macedonia?” were as follows: a new UN method for preserving peace 
(73.28%), forces for protecting Macedonia from its neighbours (11.57%), unanswered 
(9.29%) and military forces for protecting the country from a war from the north 
(5.86%). To the question “Whose interests are protected by UNPREDEP?”, 37.58% 
answered that they protect the interests of the Republic of Macedonia, US interests 
(21.71%), UN interests (16.29), EU’s interests (13.71%), while 10.71% did not answer. 
To the question “Is there a need for UNPREDEP in Macedonia?”, 51.29% of the 
respondents answered positively, 35.71% negatively, while 13% did not answer. To the 
question “Could peace in Macedonia be preserved without UNPREDEP?”, there were 
50.29% positive and 26% negative answers, and 23.71% of the respondents did not an-
swer. To the question “Is UNPREDEP able to prevent a potential war in the Republic of 
Macedonia?”, 40% of the respondents answered negatively, 36.86% answered posi-
tively, while 23.14 of them did not answer.44  
 After Slovenia, Macedonia was the second former Yugoslav republic that on 15 
November 1995 became the 27th member of the NATO’s program “Partnership for 
Peace”; not long ago, USA and Macedonia negotiated an agreement for a reciprocal 
deployment of an unspecified number of the other country’s soldiers on their respective 
territories, for an unlimited term.45 The governments of both countries have put in 
tremendous efforts into the development of bilateral relations. It seems that the purpose 
of such an orientation of the Macedonian government was to lay down the conditions 
for accomplishing several very important internal and foreign-policy goals, primarily 
those linked with the neighbouring countries. On the one hand, the establishment of the 
political and military co-operation with USA should pacify the Albanian minority in 
Macedonia, both directly – by exerting influence on the behaviour of that minority’s 
political leaders – and indirectly, by its sway over the leaders of Albania proper, with 
whom USA have already established rather intensive and amicable relations. On the 
other hand, this has had a purpose of securing a more flexible Greek stance on the 
thorny issues. Third, Macedonian leadership probably thinks that the American pres-
ence on its soil fortifies its political position in relation to the neighbouring Bulgaria i. 
e. that somehow it dampens the possible Bulgarian aspirations that might challenge 
Macedonia’s independence and territorial integrity. The fourth major goal of the es-
tablishment of such close military and other relations with USA was linked with the 
expected behaviour of SR Yugoslavia towards Macedonia following the cessation of 
hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.46 The presence of foreign troops on 
the territory of Macedonia is in the function of its national security. This has strength-
ened the belief of the Macedonian leadership that the US, in case of a conflict with Al-
bania, Greece, Bulgaria, or SR Yugoslavia, would adopt an approach similar to the one 
 
 44 See: Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, op. cit. p. 16 and pp. 26-7. 
 45 This has already been used as a pretext for about 2,000 more NATO soldiers to be deployed with the 
mandate to take part in the withdrawal of OESS monitors from Kosovo, if necessary. It is expected that very 
shortly another contingent of 3,000 NATO soldiers will be dispatched to Macedonia.  
 46 See: Duncan M. Perry, “The Republic of Macedonia: Foreign Relations, Issues, and Dilemmas”, 
Analysis of Current Events, Association for the Study of Nationalities (Eastern Europe and ex-USSR), Year 6, 
no. 10, History Department, City College of New York, May 1995, pp. 1-3. 
 
Tatalovi}, S., National Security of Macedonia, Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXV, (1998), No. 5, pp. 105—124 122 
                                                                                                                                              
employed in the Greco-Turkish conflict;47 at the same time this has reduced its rele-
vance in international relations, primarily due to the possibility that it has been turned 
into an American “military base”, or a protectorate, and that the country’s political life 
gets militarised.48  
 On the other hand, since the idea of a neutral Macedonia has been abandoned, it is 
thought that Macedonian leadership has missed on the historic opportunity to become a 
model for peaceful solutions to conflicts, as well as for the elimination of certain types 
of weapons from the Balkans. According to certain estimates, due to the Russian oppo-
sition to NATO’s eastern expansion, Macedonia can easily turn from “an oasis of 
peace” into “an apple of discontent and a destabilising factor on the Balkans and be-
yond”.49 This is indirectly contained in official Macedonian opinions that point out that 
NATO is the sole guarantor of the stability and security in Europe and that there is no 
other organisation organised and efficient enough to be able to efficiently and rapidly 
secure stability and prevent conflicts.50 That is why Macedonia views NATO as the 




 Contrary to the predictions, Macedonia has managed to preserve its independence 
despite a plethora of internal problems and external threats. This was accomplished by 
means of a balanced foreign policy and the staunch US support. US recognised in Ma-
cedonia the stabilising factor for the plight of the Balkan countries. However, even after 
eight years of independence Macedonia has not eliminated the threats to its national 
security. Some of them, like the Kosovo imbroglio, have become even more dangerous. 
Should armed conflicts erupt in Macedonia, chances are – due to the level of its eco-
nomic development, and political and military power – that Macedonia would not be 
able to defend itself successfully in an eventual simultaneous confrontation with its in-
ternal paramilitary units and the armies of, perhaps, several neighbouring countries. In 
this case, Macedonia would probably have to “choose the lesser of two evils” i.e. to 
side with Bulgarian and Albanians who, in case of a victory, might then partition the 
country, or to enter into an alliance with Greeks and Serbs who might, in case of a 
victory, challenge its independence. If the parties Macedonia sides with lose the war, 
the disappearance of Macedonia from the international scene would even be more 
certain. 
 
 47 In that sense, the preemptive intentions of this super-power are manifested in joint manouvres of the 
Albanian and the Macedonian troops on the territory of both countries, as well as in some other activities.  
 48 See: Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, op. cit., p. 9. 
 49 Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, op. cit., pp. 11-2. In the opinion of one author, it is less 
important whether the state is to be called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or by its constitutional 
name; much more important is the fact that it can still be called a “powder keg” and “bone of contention” 
(Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, op. cit., p. 2).  
 50 Bela knjiga za obranata..., op. cit., p. 29.  
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 It may be concluded that Macedonia, like other multiethnic Balkan states, might in 
the long run secure its survival if it – based on the defence model used by Switzerland, 
Sweden, or Finland – protected itself with (relatively) small armed forces, neutrality, 
and tolerance among its ethnic groups. Such insubstantial defence would be much 
cheaper, which would stimulate the development of Macedonian economy, since the 
saved resources might be funnelled for other purposes. Otherwise, by arming itself and 
accepting a large number of foreign soldiers, Macedonia might turn from “an oasis of 
peace” into “a powder keg” with unforeseeable consequences for the security of south-
east Europe.  
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